This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems are classi ed according to the regulatory regime in place. We nd that the in ation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides, although banks seem to be more pro table when Central banks supervise them, they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to more sophisticated liabilities as a funding source.
Introduction
In the last decades, the evolution of nancial markets, instruments and intermediaries has been enormous. This has been a common feature all over the world, from industrialized to developing countries. At the same time, the evolution of regulation and supervision of nancial markets has been quite di erent across countries and it is di cult to identify which features characterize optimal solutions in terms of the adopted supervisory and regulatory arrangements.
In most countries, an important role in the governance of the nancial system has traditionally been performed by the Central bank. However, since nowadays it is widely accepted that "the fundamental task of the Central bank is to preserve the value of the currency" Fischer, 1997 , the assignment to Central banks of other "optional" tasks as the responsibility on banking supervision and regulation is currently at the centre of a relevant policy debate. This feature constitutes a striking di erence among modern nancial systems: in a few countries monetary policy and banking supervision are still assigned to a unique agency, the Central bank; while in many other countries, these two functions are formally separated and the banking supervision is assigned to another agency or to more than one agency, eventually in combination with the Central bank.
A system of banking supervision, in order to be e ective, must "have clear responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of banks. Each such agency should possess operational independence and adequate resources" 1 . Can the combination of di erent responsibilities and objectives in one agency result in weak banking supervision and negatively a ect monetary policy?
In spite of its importance, this topic has not yet received an exhaustive treatment i n t h e economic literature, with only a few recent papers starting to investigate the issue. 2 Given that a sound theoretical analysis is still on the research agenda, most of the empirical studies have been devoted to check whether any relation between the combination of monetary policy and supervisory powers and the pattern of some macroeconomic variables like the in ation rate or GDP growth could be obtained. 3 Even though no 1 Principle no. 1 of the core principles for banking supervision, Basle Committee, 1997. 2 See Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1992 ,1995 , Heller 1991 , Haubrich 1996 , Peek, Rosengren and Tootell 1997 and Tuya and Zamalloa 1994 3 Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1995 analyze the microeconomic evidence between cen-3 path toward one or the other solution was proved to be clearly superior, some recent events seem to indicate that a de nitive separation of the two functions is becoming more popular.
In May 1997, the United Kingdom decided to attribute banking supervision, until then in charge of the Bank of England, to the former Securities and Investment Board, renamed Financial Services Authority. The FSA now supervises all nancial markets and intermediaries. 4 In the United States, where banking supervision is not an exclusive attribution of the Central bank, many proposals have been presented in the last years to simplify the structure of regulation and supervision on nancial markets, merging some of the agencies like the FDIC and the Comptroller of the Currency in one entity, eventually di erent from the FED Shull, 1993; Co ee, 1995; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1997. In the European Monetary Union EMU, the principle of separating monetary policy and banking supervision responsibilities has been formally established in the statute of the European Central Bank ECB. The latter empowers the ECB to set out and conduct monetary policy in the Euro area, but leaves the responsibility for banking supervision with the national authorities 5 . The evolution of nancial intermediaries, markets and instruments blurs the borders among banking, securities and insurance activities; as the speci city of banks becomes less relevant, the solution of establishing tral banks separation or combination of powers and the number and characteristics of bank failures. 4 At the same time, the degree of independence of the Bank of England was considerably strengthened by giving the Bank a full operational responsibility for setting interest rates. 5 According to Green 1995 the Treaty on European Union leaves some space to prudential supervision responsibility of the European Central Bank ECB: "Article 105 5 of the Treaty states that the European System of Central Banks 'shall contribute to ... prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the nancial system'. In 105 6 there is reference to the possibility that the ECB may be asked to undertake s p eci c tasks in relation to 'prudential supervision of credit institutions and other nancial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings '. a common regulator for the prudential regulation of all intermediaries gains ground. This is coherent with both the new theories of nancial intermediation Merton, 1993; Allen and Santomero, 1997; Allen and Gale, 1997 and some recent discussions of regulatory arrangements Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994, Di Giorgio and Di Noia, 1999. This paper aims at extending some of the theoretical arguments made in favour of separation of monetary policy and banking supervision functions, in particular by discussing the problem of who should pay for banking supervision. We also review the empirical evidence on the relationship between macroeconomic variables and supervisory regimes and we provide some additional evidence based on the pricing structure of banks in di erent countries and their aggregate balance sheets. Our arguments and ndings are somehow though not de nitively supporting the view that banking supervision should be separated and assigned to a di erent agency in the few countries where it is still combined with the Central bank. Finally, we criticize the current assignment of nancial regulation and supervisory powers in the EMU and suggest to establish an independent European System of Financial Supervisors ESFS as a device to attain a sounder scenario.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our classi cation of the supervisory regimes in place in di erent countries. In section 3 we provide some empirical ndings that emerge when comparing the macroeconomic and microeconomic performances of countries where the central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision with those of countries where it does not. In section 4, we discuss the pros and cons of the combination and separation of powers, by presenting rst a quick review of the traditional arguments developed in the literature 4.1 and 4.2, and by adding some new theoretical considerations in favour of the separation solution 4.3. Section 5 deals with the problem of nancial stability in Europe. We summarize our arguments in section 6.
Supervisory arrangements
A neat comparison and classi cation of di erent structures of banking supervision and, in general, nancial supervision in countries all over the world is a di cult target to reach, given the peculiar institutional arrangements that characterize each single economic system. In some countries, an agency in charge of these functions may beformally separated by the Central bank but acting so closely to it that it could e ectively be more dependent on the Central bank with respect to, say, the banking supervision department of another country's Central bank.
A recent study conducted by the IMF Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994 provides one of the most complete pictures of the situation. 6 It shows that in the 167 then Member Countries, "bank supervision is conducted by the Central bank in over 60 per cent and that the Western Hemisphere 7 was the only region where the percentage declined to 50 percent. Nevertheless, in over 80 per cent of Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries, banking supervision is a function of the Central bank" Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994; moreover, in 75 per cent of European countries di erent from the former U.S.S.R. countries, banking supervision was a function assigned to Central banks. The problem with these numbers is that they take into account many v ery small States like Sao Tome, Myanmar, Vanuatu, etc. and that the classi cation method includes all countries in which some supervisory powers are given to Central banks and not whether Central banks have monopoly power in banking supervision or cooperate with other entities.
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In our paper, in order to be as precise as possible, we classify the countries in two categories: those where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision, on one side; all the others where Central bank is not in charge of it or, in any case, is not the only agency in charge, on the other side. Moreover, we focus only on OECD countries table 1   9 , where the situation looks quite di erent with respect to the one depicted in the previously quoted IMF review: in fact, a complete monopoly of Central banks in banking supervision seems more likely in countries with an underdeveloped nancial system, and a few internationally active banks.
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. table 1, insert here Table 1 shows that in many nancially developed countries, banking supervision is now not or not any more a monopoly of the Central bank. Among the G-5, only UK could be considered as a country where monetary policy and banking supervision were combined. As already stressed, this is no longer true after the 1997 reform.
Given that classi cation in one or another category is inherently subjective, we take as a rst proxy for the institutional framework of banking supervision the composition of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, at least for membercountries. In fact, in the Committee, "countries are represented by their central banks and also by the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking business where this in not the Central bank" Basle Committee, 1997, emphasis added. This means that if a Central bank is a monopolist in supervision only its representatives are admitted to the Committee; if some countries are represented by members beyond central banks, it means that other institutions are responsible. It turns out that in the Basle Committee only 4 countries Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom were represented only by Central bank o cers; while the other 8 countries were represented not only by the Central bank but also by another agency in the case of USA by other 3 agencies 11 . This means that in 66 of the Basle Committee countries without taking 10 Two relevant exceptions are the United Kingdom, until the 1997 reform, and Italy. Measuring the degree of nancial development of di erent economies is a di cult task. As a v ery preliminar evidence of the fact that "monopolist" central banks tend to operate in countries whose nancial systems are less developed, we h a v e used the synthetic index of nancial development derived by Di Giorgio and Reichlin 1996 for EU countries. This index combines pieces of information based on two of the nancial indicators used by King and Levine 1993 -nancial depth and the ratio of credit to the non nancial private sector to total domestic credit -plus other three sources weight of the nancial sector in total employment, the lending-borrowing spread, and the e ciency of the payment system. This index is considerably lower in the rst half of the 90s 2.6 against 3.1 in countries where the central bank is a monopolist in banking supervision. The di erence is more striking 2.2 to 3.1 if we exclude UK whose nancial index is the highest in the sample from the analysis. Empirical evidence on the best choice of banking supervisory agencies can only be provided by looking at ex-post micro and macro data in di erent countries.
Most of the early papers Heller, 1991; Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992 and 1995; Masciandaro, 1993 compared the track record of central banks with supervisory responsibilities with that of central banks without regulatory tasks in achieving the central goal of monetary policy, a low in ation rate. All these studies support the thesis that Central banks without supervisory responsibilities have a better in ation track record. Instead, no clear correlation can be established between di erent supervisory arrangements and real growth rates.
We start by re-examining this evidence for industrialized countries according to our previous classi cation of the banking supervisory regime in place. We consider the consumer price index from the IMF Financial Statistics and compare the average in ation rate from 1960 to 1996 in 24 OECD countries excluding Mexico.
It is evident that even among quite homogeneous economies, average ination is more than double 11.21 versus 5.09 in countries where the Central bank is a monopolist in banking supervision.
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Even if we exclude Iceland and Turkey the situation does not change much: in ation is 50 higher in "monopolist" countries 7.64 versus 5,09 table 2 and graphs 1 and 2. : "it may well be that independent central banks are better in attaining the goal of price stability and that these independent banks also do not tend to have supervisory responsibilities". 14 In any case, simple correlations between variables can not be interpreted as suggesting any causal relationship.
Hence, we turn to a simple regression in order to check the robustness of this result. We estimate an equation in which a v erage in ation in the sample is the dependent v ariable and we include among the regressors a dummy v ariable for countries where banking supervision is assigned to Central banks in monopoly. We also include the index of Central bank independence derived by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991, in order to control for the possibility that any e ect of the banking supervisory regime on in ation would just re ect a poorer degree of independence of the Central banks to which this task is assigned. 13 Also Masciandaro 1993 links the problem of Central bank independence with the assignment of supervisory responsibilities. After dividing Central banks in four classes monopolist in supervision and independent; monopolist in supervision and dependent; not monopolist in supervision and independent; not monopolist in supervision and dependent., he nds that all Central banks with monopoly in banks supervision have a w orse in ation record, a higher money rate of growth and a higher ratio de cit GNP. Moreover, among OECD countries, dependent Central banks are associated with a lower real rate of GDP growth.
14 "In a way this argument, if found to be true, would support the basic hypothesis: namely that bank supervisory responsibility is a governmental function that is unlikely to be given to a truly independent Central bank. In other words, the supervisory role for a Central bank does tend to be associated with signi cant strings in terms of greater dependence on the government" Heller, 1991. 15 Bini Smaghi 1998b conducted the same analysis in a smaller sample 1974-90 and obtained similar results. He nds that the dummy v ariable related to the assignment o f supervisory powers to central banks remains a signi cant determinant of in ation performance even when di erent indicators of central bank independence, as the ones constructed by Alesina and Summers 1993 or Cuckierman 1992 are included in the regression.
where standard errors are reported in parenthesis, GMT is the independence index and MON our dummy.
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Central bank independence is signi cantly and negatively a ecting ination performance. The hypothesis that banking supervision conducted monopolistically by Central banks does not a ect in ation is instead rejected.
If a Central bank were less able to control prices given the eventual tradeo with nancial stability, we would also expect higher variance in price movements. In order to control for the fact that di erent levels of in ation might induce di erent v ariances for equal percentage variations, we calculate for the same countries the coe cient of variation the ratio of standard deviation over average. We nd that the value is higher 13 where Central bank supervise banks 69 versus 61, thereby suggesting that these Central banks meet more di culties in smoothing in ation over time table 2. Again, excluding Iceland and Turkey the result is basically the same: 66 versus 61 10 higher in monopolist countries.
Interest rates
We now turn to investigate whether the pricing behavior of banks, which in a way re ects their e ciency in performing their most typical activity, is a ected by the supervisory regime in place. A rst indicator to consider is the spread between the rate of return on bank assets and liabilities: in particular we look at the spread between the average deposit and lending rates in di erent countries.
We also divide this spread into its basic components, i.e. a mark-up on loans and a mark-down on deposits. This exercise is interesting as it allows to identify what the real sources of pro ts for banks in net interest income are.
United Kingdom; the "not-monopolist" countries are Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland
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. Although the spread does not show signi cant di erences among the two groups of countries, what is interesting to notice is its composition: the markdown on depositors is three times higher in countries where Central banks are monopolist in supervision, and conversely mark-up is three times higher in "not-monopolist" countries table 3 and graph 3.  table 3 and graph 3, insert here This would seem to suggest that banks not supervised by Central Banks are better in doing the lending activity or, at least, have more bargaining power with respect to borrowers. Notice that this feature does not depend on the fact that these banks operate in somehow underdeveloped nancial systems. Instead, in "monopolist" countries, banks seem to bene t more by exploiting depositors who keep money in bank deposits at a rate considerably lower than the risk free rate. Of course, it is di cult to believe that this kind of "rent" will last long in a more and more integrated nancial framework, meaning that "high mark-down" banks will have to quickly increase noninterest income if they want to avoid to encounter severe troubles in the future.
The "low mark-up" observed in "monopolist" countries may be a sign of strong competition in the lending activity. On the other side, banks might have l o w ered too much their lending rates in order to capture in any case the borrowers 20 or, may be,for political pressures, etc. In this section we try to analyze if there is any evidence of an impact of the institutional arrangements of banking supervision over the structure and behavior of banks, comparing countries where Central banks are "monopolist" with those where they are "not-monopolist".
Comparisons among banks of di erent countries are inevitably awed due to legal and accounting procedures; besides, it is the structure itself of di erent nancial systems that makes di erences inevitable, as institutions "called" banks operate such di erent activities in di erent countries. In order to minimize these errors we take OECD data from Bank Pro tability and we compare the "all banks" series and the "commercial banks 22 " series, for "monopolist" and "not-monopolist" countries, during the period 1985-94 23 .
We then consider four groups of data normalized by with the balance sheet dimension and gross and net bank income. For the "monopolist" countries we calculate an average of results with and without Turkey given the deep di erences in both the real and nancial sectors of this country.
24 Table 4 insert here We do not really nd clear patterns in favor of one or another institutional arrangement, even though some interesting facts arise. For example, gross income of "all banks", normalized by the average balance sheet total, is 40 higher where the Central bank supervises banks and net income is 85 higher, too. A similar result is valid for data on "commercial banks". Even with higher provisions as a percentage of the total balance 25 , banks in less compensated by the loss of e ciency in resource allocation and other costs linked to its bail out. 22 For Denmark and Iceland we use the "commercial banks and savings banks" series. 23 There are some exception due to availability o f OECD data. The starting data for some countries are di erent: Australia 1986 , Austria 1987 , France 1988 , Greece 1989 , Italy 1989 24 OECD data do not include Ireland. We only report the table with the average numbers. Data for individual countries are contained in OECD, Bank Pro tability, 1997. 25 Even though OECD data report higher total provisions with respect to the average balance sheet total in monopolist countries, Jappelli and Pagano 1998 have estimated both non performing loans and loan loss provisions for loans as a percentage of total loans in a larger set of countries and obtained strikingly di erent results. When we look at their estimates we notice that on average, loss provisions on loans are 3 times higher 0.75 aginst 0.25 in not-monopolist countries Table X. With the caveat associated to the di erent content of aggregated data in heterogeneous countries, this conclusion could be suggestive of the presence of a moral hazard problem in the banking sectors supervised by Central "monopolist" countries show higher pro ts in average, both before and after tax.
These results could suggest that banking supervision assigned to Central banks can be associated with more pro table banking sectors. On the other side, the data obviously regard only surviving banks. There could be accounting rules and supervisory regulations in place that may allow "insider" banks to resist entrance from outsiders and thus show pro ts that in the long run should not last.
With this caveat, better comparable "e ciency" indicators can be derived by looking at the cost side. Here, "monopolist" countries have banks whose sta costs are 50 higher than those in not-monopolist countries as a percentage of total balance. In particular sta costs represent more than half of operating expenses in monopolist countries.
Balance sheet structure
When we analyze the strucutre of both the asset and liability sides of the average balance sheets for the four groups of series, some other features have to beunderlined. For example, in the asset side, loans are relatively lower in monopolist countries more evidently for commercial banks. Another di erence is that where Central banks supervise, then they maintain a closer relationship with the supervised banks in the sense that the cash and balance with the Central bank aggregate is 300 higher in monopolist countries: this is probably due to di erent compulsory reserve requirements, with this instrument used both as a monetary policy tool and a guarantee for deposit protection where a single agency is responsible for both monetary policy and the stability of the banking system.
On the liability side, it is to enlight the di erent use of nancial instrumets, with monopolist countries characterized by a higher percentage of non bank deposits, and not-monopolist countries issuing about 50 of bonds more.
Market Structure in EU countries.
A recent study conducted by the ECB 1999 allows to compare di erent capacity indicators and features of the banking systems in the EU countries. In banks: in monopolist countries loss provisions on loans are lower as banks internalize that the regulator-supervisor will more easily bail them out in case of trouble.
table 5 we report 1996 data on the number of branches, ATMs and employees per 1,000 inhabitants, plus gures relative to average wages in banking as a percentage of total wages and a market concentration index based on the percentage of total assets in banking held by the 5 top institutions in each country.
When we divide EU countries in "monopolist" and "not monopolist" types according to the previous classi cation, we observe the following:
a Monopolist countries are characterized on average by lower market concentration. Again this could be interpreted in two opposite ways: on one side, this feature suggests less market power and a more competitive banking system; on the other side, it could as well bethat the central bank -regulator raised excessive barriers to merges and acquisitions in the sector thereby limiting the role of the market and pro t-seeking behaviour.
b Figures relative to capacity indicators are roughly similar, indicating only a somehow smaller presence of both ATMs and employees and a higher density of branches in monopolist countries. , an aspect that has not been deeply analyzed yet is whether the regulatory and supervisory functions should be attributed to central banks or to a di erent agency. An additional interesting question to ask is which agency should be responsible for antitrust regulation in the banking system.
The problem of institutional separation between banking supervision and monetary policy has been started to be investigated only recently, even though the traditional literature on central banking from Bagehot, 1873, on somehow tackled the problem. Some contributions are Heller 1991 , Goodhart and Shoenmaker 1992 , Masciandaro 1993 Wages in banking as a percentage of total wages are similar across the two groups. If a di erence is to be underlined, this refers to higher wages in central-southern European countries with respect to the Anglo-Saxon and Northern Europe world.
27 See Goodhart 1995 , Fischer 1996 and Blinder 1998 . Cuckierman 1992 , Alesina and Summers 1993 and Persson and Tabellini 1996 deal with the problems of political and economic independence, credibility and coordination of monetary with scal policy. Zamalloa 1994 , Haubrich 1996 and Davies 1997 . All these papers underline both the advantages and disadvantages of separating versus combining the two functions.
As Tuya and Zamalloa 1994 make clear, there is a cross e ect of banking supervision over monetary policy and viceversa. In fact, monetary policy decision-makers are concerned about the safety and soundness of the banking system for the e ect it may h a v e on the integrity of the payment system, the transmission of monetary policy signals, resource allocations and the cost of monetary policy in case of crises. Banks supervisors, on the other hand, are interested in monetary stability, since this is associated with lower volatility in nominal and real interest rates and, possibly, i n e x c hange rates.
The advantages of banking supervision in the Central bank
The advantages of having banking supervision combined with monetary policy in the Central bank are important a s this solution entails relevant information on both macro and microeconomic variables.
The Central bank will be able to acquire valuable insights into the overall state of the economy by being involved in the supervision and regulation of nancial institutions. A recent study on the US economy Peek, Rosengren and Tootell, 1997 shows that con dential supervisory information on bank ratings allows the Federal Reserve to improve signi cantly the forecast of macroeconomic variables as the rates of ination and unemployment, thus allowing monetary policy to react in a better way to the eventual deviation of these forecasts from the target. Besides, "being able to in uence bank policy through regulatory pressure might give additional force and impetus to monetary policy measures " Heller, 1991 . According to this view, the coordination of monetary policy and banking supervision is necessary given that they are interrelated. In particular, monetary policy must use proper instruments such that its transmission through nancial intermediaries to the real sector is e cient. Another fundamental macro argument supporting a uni ed agency is the protection of the payment system, a key channel for the potential spread of contagion risk. "The Central banks' growing awareness of the liquidity and the credit risks in net and gross with uncollateralized overdrafts settlements systems and their implicit or explicit assumption of these risks, have initiated several risk reduction policies: the most direct measure used to be,and still is, to control access and monitor the participants" Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992 . The main argument for combining the functions of monetary and supervisory management within the Central bank is however linked to the Central bank's concern for the systemic stability of the nancial system Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1995 . Hence, the micro-information advantage suggest that "combination is particularly needed in times of nancial crises when only direct supervision can deliver the essential information on time" Haubrich, 1996 . In fact, a Central bank supervising the banking system might know more precisely if a bank asking for credit from the lender of last resort is insolvent or just illiquid thereby deserving it; but Goodhart and Shoemaker 1995 show empirically that this argument does not hold in the sense that "the revealed preference of monetary authorities has been to rescue banks running into di culties, so long as there appeared to beany risk of a systemic knock-on e ect". It could also bethat this traditional motivation to have the two functions in charge of a unique institutions is today obsolete: runs seem to occur only in textbooks because "the probability that a modern bank is solvent but illiquid and at the same time lacks collateral to obtain regular central bank funding, is quite small" Padoa Schioppa 1999.
The disadvantages of banking supervision in the Central bank
The major disadvantage of assigning to Central banks the joint responsibility for the two functions is the "con ict of interest" argument. We classify the con icts that can possibly emerge in the following categories:
First, a general problem of inconsistent policy assignment can emerge, given that with just one policy instrument there are two objectives to control: a trade-o among monetary stability and microstability o fnancial intermediaries in particular, banking intermediaries may exist and be di cult to tackle. In fact, it could well be that monetary authorities might wish for higher interest rates e.g. to maintain an exchange rate peg, to bear down on in ation, or to reduce the pace of monetary growth while the regulatory authorities "are frightened about the adverse e ect such higher rates may h a v e upon the bad debts, pro tability, capital adequacy and solvency of the banking system. It is in this guise that the con ict has, indeed, from time to time occurred" Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992 28 . The alternative situation, monetary policy being conducted with excessive regard for supervisory concerns about the health of one or more nancial institutions, is potentially even more dangerous as it might lead to inappropriate monetary policies that might, in the long run, even worsen the problems at stake Heller, 1991 . The combination of functions might also lead to expectations on the part of the private sector that "the Central bank might bein uenced by nancial system stability considerations when determining monetary policy" Goodhart and Shoemaker, 1995 . This "in uence" may becaused by a regulatory capture and rent seeking behavior by intermediaries and by reputation costs that are perceived to be very high for Central banks in case of a bank failure. Being involved in the crisis of a bank under its control may as well hurt the Central bank global credibility, with negative e ects on its ability of controlling in ation. In fact, a reduced credibility could induce worse in ation expectations that are relevant determinant of in ation itself. Other con icts of interest may arise as "the Central bank may employ access to the discount window and monetary reserves as banking 28 Di Giorgio 1999 argues that it is also possible that a con ict of interest emerges as a consequence, in given periods, of a preference for lower interest rates by the monetary authority. In a context of price stability and low growth, it might be desirable for the monetary authority to reduce interest rates; however, if the banking sector is characterized by l o w pro tability and by a pronounced exposure of the asset side of the balance sheet to market interest rates with respect to the liability side, it is possible that a reduction in interest rates contributes to further deteriorate bank pro tability, at least in the short run, and is thereby opposed by the regulatory agency. This argument is applied to explain the prudent behavior of the Bank of Italy in terms of the chosen path for the o cial rates of interest the discount rate and the one on xed-term advances in 1997 and in 1998 prior to the start of EMU.
supervision sanctioning tools to encourage banks to implement supervisory recommendation" Tuya and Zamalloa, 1991. In this case banks would rarely appeal supervisory sanctions for the fear of raising reserve requirements, or receiving inspections.
29
"A more general point is that the cyclical e ects of micro regulatory and macro monetary policy tend to con ict. Macro-monetary policy is supposed to be counter-cyclical, while the e ect of regulation, e.g. capital adequacy requirements, tend to be procyclical" Goodhart and Shoenmaker, 1992 . An example of procyclical e ect of regulation on credit growth is that "during a period of economic slowdown, a banks volume of non performing assets is likely to be increasing and the bank supervisor will be requiring higher provisions for possible loan losses and applying pressure on the banks to improve the quality of their portfolios. The banks' implementation of the bank supervisor recommendations and prudent banking principles would result in tighter credit during an economic recession" Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994. Monetary policy expansionary reasons may push to lower the minimum capital asset ratios to free resources for the economy but undermining the intermediaries' stability. A tight monetary policy, on the other side, may have an impact on bank solvency as high interest rates increase the risk of loan defaults in the banking system.
New institutional considerations
The pros and cons of the separation between the monetary policy and the bank supervision agency do not seem overwhelming to describe a rst best solution.
In particular, the con ict of interest argument does not seem strongly convincing given that, for example, raising interest rates do not necessarily damage banks: it depends on the structure of the balance sheet and on the possibility that the banks can or can not pass along to customers the new rates 30 . The con ict between counter-cyclical policies and the procyclicality 29 "This con ict may also appear when the Central bank applies bank supervisory sanctions to e ect monetary policy -for example denying approval of branch license to a sound bank in an attempt to coerce the bank into more active participation in the Central bank's open market operations" Tuya and Zamalloa, 1994. 30 See Di Giorgio 1999.
18
of capital requirements seems to be more compelling. This is especially evident when Central banks act according with the "too big to fail" principle: in fact the action of the supervisor should be independent of the size of supervised banks. However, "it is not easy for the regulator, in case of big banks' crisis, not to bein uenced by administrative and political pressures and by microeconomic and macroeconomic worries" 31 . In this section we provide some new arguments in favour of the thesis of separating monetary policy and banking supervision responsibilities. These are based on other factors a ecting institutional arrangements.
A rst consideration emerges with respect to an apparently unrelated problem, that of deposit protection. As Goodhart and Shoemaker 1992 and 1995 show, it is useless to have a deposit insurance agency without any supervisory powers given that, in this case, it would just act like a cash department executing orders of other agencies. A deposit insurance agency should have, like in the US FDIC, supervisory powers 32 : it could in principle be merged into the Central bank, but this solution could easily generate moral hazard problems with both the bank managers and the depositors. Hence, the optimal solution seems to give to an agency separated by the Central bank both banking supervision and deposit insurance management: otherwise two agencies would have the same supervisory powers and the costs for the banking system woulg be doubled.
The second fact to consider is that the evolution of nancial market, intermediaries and instruments make them less di erent one from the others: banks, securities rms and life insurance, investment and pension funds engage in activities which are day by day more similar and linked
33
. Banks remain special only for the fact that part of their liabilites sight deposits are money and have a certain nominal value independent from market uctuations. However, the percentage of sight deposits in bank liabilities and with respect to GDP is falling in most advanced countries. It is hard to believe that this remains a strong justi cation for di erent supervisory arrangements, in particular given the existence of an explicit deposit insurance. A common regulatory agency is thus needed, and many countries do in fact have it UK, Finland, Norway,etc.. If this agency were the Central bank, expectations of the kind of "too central-bank-supervised to fail" institutions 31 De Bonis and Luberti 1997. 32 See Di Noia, 1994. 33 See Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Santomero 1997, Di Giorgio and Di Noia 1999. could arise. As a matter of fact, Central banks did already intervene in the past to bail out non banking nancial intermediaries see for example some recent case in Japan: moral hazard problems could emerge again, negatively a ecting market discipline.
In any case Central banks should not have a n titrust powers in the banking industry. Actually, this is a problem which is relevant only in a few countries, Italy being the most relevant example. The inevitable trade o that exists in the short term between micro-stability and competition would lead Central banks to obstacle the exit from the banking industry of ine cient rms, claiming that the negative impact on the real economy and investors might be high 34 . This kind of behavior is clearly ine cient given that the only investors to protect di erently from others are the small depositors, who already have deposit insurance: why bank bondholders should instead be protected di erently than bondholders of industrial rms?
Another point is linked to the fact that in some institutional arrangements, Central banks are also characterized by another, and much stronger, con ict of interest: they are allowed to hold shares in the banks that they supervise. This happens again in Italy, where the Bank of Italy is one of the greatest shareholders of Italian stocks 35 . In this case there is such a high 34 In Italy where antitrust in banking is in charge of the Central bank, it often happened that the consultative opinions of the antitrust agency as regards cases of banking mergers and acquisitions were opposite to the compelling decisions of the Bank of Italy See Cafagna and Sciolli, 1996. 35 The Bank of Italy has equity i n v estment for two reasons: "just over half are held for the bene t of the sta pension fund; the Bank of Italy also parks part of its statutory reserves in equities this part of the portfolio was worth 860 billion lire at the end of 1996" The Economist, 1997. Few public informations are available on its trading activities but public data Consob, 1999 are available for shareholdings exceeding 2 of capital in companies listed in the Italian Stock Exchange. As of December 31st 1998, the Bank of Italy possessed stakes higher than 2 of the capital in 12 listed companies while stakes under this threshold remain private information of the holder. It owned 7,89 of Italfondiario, a middle term bank, plus many participations in important insurance companies Generali, 4.74; INA, 2.54; La Fondiaria, 2.32; etc.. In turn, these insurance companies own relevant share in some of the biggest domestic banks for example, Generali is the largest shareholder of Banca Commerciale Italiana. And Generali's most important shareholder is an investment bank, Mediobanca, whose capital is shared by the same Banca Commerciale Italiana, Unicredito Italiano and Cassa di Risparmio di Roma, three former public-owned banks. INA is instead a former public-owned insurance company that recently entered in the rescue plan of a disastred public-owned bank, Banco di Napoli, in a joint v enture with another domestic bank that was at the time totally owned by the Italian Treasury, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. Finally, Bank of Italy is the second shareholder of Telecom Italia. correlation between the Central bank's decisions in terms of interest rates, and the rate of return of its equity i n v estments that the Government should either impose a prohibition of investment in shares or at least an external independent management of the pension fund as well as a full disclosure of its investment portfolio. More importantly, a supervision agency should never possess shares of supervised entities nor of other institutions possessing shares in the same supervised entities.
However, our main argument in favor of separation is the one of the appropriate nancing of monetary policy and banking supervision activity.
Central bank nancing
The problem of cost-accountability should lead to separating the two functions of monetary policy and banking supervision. Usually Central banks are mainly funded in two ways: seignorage and compulsory reserves.
On one side, they are legal monopolist in issuing liabilities at no cost cash and investing them in nancial instruments and foreign currencies to operate monetary policy. This funding independence is fundamental to correctly operate monetary policy even if, in many countries, the lack of political and economic independence imposes the Central bank to issue liabilities in excess, thereby increasing in ation in the medium-long run. In any case, there is no doubt that if Central banks were nanced by a transfer from the Treasury, their independence could beseriously undermined. Moreover, many Central banks at the end of each year return, depending on di erent regulatory arrangements, to the Treasury part of their pro ts like i n U K o r in Italy, even if formally the Treasury is often not even a "shareholder" of the Central Bank. Naturally, the presence of pro ts does not allow Central banks to behave ine ciently neither in monetary policy nor in any other activity they could be performing. The reason is that these pro ts are gained as a result of a legal monopoly, which is implicitly nanced by all taxpayers.
Another source of nancing can be due to the compulsory reserve regime. In many countries banks are obliged to keep a fraction of the deposits they collect in zero or low-interest deposits at the Central bank. Hopefully, the rate of return of these sums is higher and contributes to nance part or all of the Central bank activity 36 , including monetary policy. However it may happen that the rate of interest paid on compulsory reserves, which is established by the Central bank itself, is temporarily higher than the risk-free market rate 37 : in this case, the Central bank and eventually all taxpayers given that some seignorage is always in place is subsidizing the domestic banking system given that only domestic banks are subject to reserve requirements and at the same time creating obstacles to competition among national and foreign banks.
As a consequence of these considerations, we see two problems in having banking supervision assigned to the Central bank.
First, the cost of supervision is merged with the one of monetary policy: in this way, e ciency in supervisory activity could beweakened given that there is no separate cost accountability, or it would at least be di cult to assess.
Across countries, Central banks have di erent costs which are of course di cult to compare given that the activities they actually perform are quite di erent. Davies 1997 documents the di erence in 1992 cost of various Central banks, controlling for both size and population: a striking result is that, for example, the Bank of Italy seems to cost 5 times more than the Bank of England, even if both were at the time in charge of banking supervision 38 . One could argue that the solution is not necessarily that Central banks quit supervisory responsibilities: they could just have a separate budget assigned in their balance sheet for this function. However, in this way there will be some inevitable "transfer pricing" among the di erent departments and the gures would not be precise, given the presence of economies of scope in the di erent activities. 39 those assets and the costs incurred by the Bank in printing, issuing, sorting and destroying notes: the entire pro ts of the note issue are paid over to HM Treasury. The Banking Department all the rest of the Bank is funded by Cash Ratio Deposits which banks in the UK place interest-free with the Bank, on the basis of the size of its eligible liabilities 0.35: the Banking Department's income derives principally from investment in British Goverment securities, Treasury and commercial bills and advances to customers Bank of England, 1997a. 37 This situation happened in Italy during 1997. See Di Giorgio 1997. 38 A major cost component for the Bank of Italy is however linked to the functions that it performs acting as the Cash department of the Ministry of the Treasury. 39 The Bank of England Annual Report shows cost allocation for the di erent operations: bank supervision cost 19 of all Bank's operating costs. More correctly a fraction of the cost of other departments like Finance and Resources 3 of the total and Personnel 7 should be added.
Second, it is not necessarily true that the supervisory cost of an industry must bepaid by all taxpayers, who may not be consumers of the good: it could be possible that these costs can be paid directly by the supervised entities and the consumers of these products. This is what happens for many other regulatory agencies. The objection that banking stability could beviewed as a public good seems too strong to us, and in any case it is not clear that the cost of banking supervision and regulation coincide with that of the stability o f the banking system. Moreover, from the point of view of macroeconomic stability there is no doubt that also the well functioning of the industrial system is important; however, there is no agency in charge of the stability of this system which is nanced by all taxpayers.
On the other side, it is not necessarily e cient that the costs of monetary policy and of other Central banks' activities including eventually banking supervision must be paid by banks: in fact Central banks' revenues would be cyclical and thus lower in period of crisis of banks when exactly supervision must be strengthened.
Again this does not necessarily mean that a separate entity is needed but certainly a separate entity w ould be more accountable for the use of this money: it would be clearer who is paying and for what.
In this case, the problem of being nanced by the industry rather than by a public transfer would be also another one. The public transfer, in a sense, limits the activities of the agency and so an industry-nancing enhances the independence of the agency. But in this way there is the classic problem of taxation without representation as the supervisory agency could expand its revenues without limit Sarcinelli, 1996 . This could beavoided having independent representatives appointed by the industry as commissioners of the agency.
The solution we view as the most acceptable is that the Central bank is only nanced by seignorage in order to operate monetary policy, and not at all by compulsory reserves. Should reserve requirments beconsidered as an integral part of a strategy of monetary control, mandatory reserves should be remunerated at a market rate or, better, invested in a money-market fund so that the e ective rate of return produced could beredistributed to the industry. The separated banking supervision agency should instead be nanced in a mixed way: partly with a public transfer and partly by the industry.
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5 Financial regulation in the EMU: a proposal.
In the European Monetary Union EMU, the principle of separating monetary policy and banking supervision responsibilities has been clearly established in the statute of the European Central Bank ECB. The latter empowers the ECB to set out and conduct monetary policy in the Euro area, but seems to assign the responsibility for banking supervision to the national authorities. I n a w a y , it could then be argued that a problem of institutional separation between monetary policy and banking supervision agencies does not exist any longer in the Euro area. 40 Actually, in this area, as in most industrialised countries, the term banking supervision should bereplaced by that of nancial supervision. Banks are no longer so special: they perform many tasks and o er di erent nancial services universal banks, including investment and insurance services; they are often part of industrial companies and or they control them. The stability of the nancial system is not so much at risk because of the loan deposit activities performed by banks. Instead, nancial instability could be induced by activities linked to portfolio management, which are typical of investment banks and securities rms. 41 Hence, the real problem to tackle should be the separation between the tasks of monetary policy and nancial supervision.
The current institutional arrangement in the EMU, however, is far from satisfactory for a series of reasons.
1 In some countries, like Italy and the Netherlands, where the national central bank NCB is a monopolist in banking supervision, the separation is not complete as the NCB Governor does also participate to the de nition of the general strategies of European monetary policy which are set out in 40 In fact, "even in countries where the competent authority for banking supervision is the central bank, by de nition this authority is, functionally speaking, no longer a central bank, as it lacks the key central banking task of autonomously controlling money creation" Padoa Schioppa, 1999. For this reason, the argument of the eventual separation between the agencies responsible for monetary policy and banking supervision has necessarily to be discussed at a European level. 41 A w ell known recent example of a serious threat to nancial stability is the LTCM case. Here, a non bank institution was rescued thanks to the moral suasion of the FED, that is not responsible for the supervision of hedge funds.
the ECB Governing Council.
2 Does it make a n y sense to have a common monetary policy and aim at an always more integrated nancial system in the Euro area while keeping di erent nancial regulations and supervising rules in each member country? As a matter of fact, these institutional di erences are an important barrier to further nancial integration. In this eld, the principle of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition, that was originally thought to be able to naturally induce over time a convergence of regulatory behaviour and more uniform rules, clearly did not work. Moreover, there is a concrete risk that competition in this area will not even generate the more e cient outcome: on one side there exists an obvious incentive to promote less demanding domestic nancial regulations and supervision in order to let the own country become more attractive for running nancial business; while on the other side it is not clear who will pay the costs of potential insolvency following excessive risk taking behavior and nancial misconduct in a member country see 3 below. Finally, with increasing international banking activities and a European real time gross settlement system in place Target, the argument that domestic regulators and supervisors have better knowledge and can exercise more e cient control becomes day by day less e ective. Suppose we face a situation in which a single nancial institution located in a member country is in trouble. What kind of intervention, if any, is currently allowed? One of the typical forms of public intervention seems lost, and probably the most natural, that of Central bank last resort loans. The ECB will not intervene in favour of a single institution, expecially if its nancial links are mostly domestic. Also because it could always assign some of the responsibility for the crisis to the domestic nancial regulator-supervisor. The domestic Central bank can not intervene by providing funds without an explicit authorization by the ECB. In this case, it will have to convince the latter that the institution is facing a liquidity and not a solvency crisis, according to the Bagehot's doctrine 1873, and or that the risk of potential spread and contagion of the crisis is high. This requires time and resources.
The other two traditional instruments, bail out through a safety net provided by the banking system or through the government budget will ultimately shift the burden on the shoulders of domestic taxpayers, expecially in the framework established in the Stability and Growth Pact. Given the current level of taxes in Europe, this is hardly an optimal solution.
We think that a much higher degree of coordination in the eld of nancial regulation and prudential supervision is both desirable and needed in the EMU. Moreover, our view is not limited to the banking system but embraces all nancial intermediaries. Hence, we see three possible paths of institutional changes that can reintroduce the function of lending of last resort in the Euro area and at the same time allow for a sounder scenario in case of a nancial crisis. We list them in increasing order according to our preferences, but we view all of them as better solutions with respect to the current situation.
1 The rst possibility is to assign supervisory powers and responsibilites in the banking sector to the ECB. However, as it would be desirable to have a common supervisor for all nancial intermediaries, an amendement of the Maastricht Treaty would benecessary, as the latter explicitely forbids that supervisory powers regarding insurance rms be assigned to the ECB.
2 A new European System of Financial Supervisors ESFS, structured similarly to the ESCB, could be established. A European Financial Regulation Authority EFRA should beat the centre of the system. This would harmonize and coordinate nancial regulation in membercountries, design common principles and guidelines for prudential supervision and set out appropriate disclosure instruments and requirements. It should be in charge of banks, securities rms, mutual, pension and hedge funds, life insurance and all nancial intermediaries and securities markets.
The EFRA should beformally separated by the ECB, both in order to avoid excessive concentration of powers as well as for the arguments made 26 above.
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In each country, a new agency similar in structure to the Financial Service Authority recently established in the UK will participate to the definition of the general strategies and principles of nancial regulation in the area, becoming a memberof the ESFS. This agency will be responsible for the implementation in the domestic country of both the rules and the supervisory duties agreed upon at the Euro level.
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In each single country, this agency will be the sole responsible for nancial stability and correct disclosure of all nancial intermediaries.
3 Establish two new di erent European Agencies, one responsible for the "stability" and one for "transparency and disclosure requirements" of all nancial intermediaries. The two central agencies should coordinate the di erent domestic agencies in each member country. In this solution, we will then have two di erent ESFS according to the principles that suggest to replace "institutional" regulation by "functional regulation" or by objective.
Under both 2 and 3, no antitrust power will be given to any memberof the ESFS, so as to avoid the trade-o between competition on one side and stability and transparncy on the other. Moreover, agencies responsible for supervising market competition do exist at both Euro and domestic levels.
A special Committee and desk for the lending of last resort function will be established at the ECB, with the participation only for information and communication purposes of members of the one or two ESFS. The ESFS or the one responsible for "stability" will promote the participation of intermediaries, in each country, to a limited insurance fund that could provide good quality collateral to institutions facing liquidity problems in order to beable to qualify for central bank nancing. The national agency will manage the fund and assess whether an institution is just illiquid or insolvent. In the latter case, provision of collateral should bedenied. The domestic government could still decide whether to bail out the institution or 44 A relevant issue is "who pays for nancial supervision and how m uch i t costs". An attribution to the ECB of these functions could be less transparent given that they may be confused in the monetary policy ones thus inducing lower accountability. 45 Both the national and the central European levels of nancial supervisors should exist,
given the current level of harmonization in the nancial market legislation, which is far from complete, in particular with respect to taxation, accounting rules and banking crises management.
27 not, being responsible and politically accountable for the decision.
Conclusions
The institutional separation of the agencies in charge of monetary policy and banking supervision is an important issue. In most developed countries, Central banks are not any longer "monopolist" in banking supervision. Empirical comparisons among di erent nancial systems are di cult to evaluate: banks seem to bemore pro table if Central bank supervise them but show higher sta costs and issue less bonds, which could be interpreted as an indicator of lower e ciency. On the macroeconomic side, the in ation rate is con rmed to behigher and more volatile if Central bank is "distracted" by supervision. New, though still preliminar, evidence shown in this paper seems to suggest that banks supervised by Central banks are relatively more pro table on the deposit side than on the lending side: as this trend could eventually stop because of further nancial markets integration, their competitive position may bemore at risk unless they expand pro tability on the lending side and on some other activities risk management, services, etc.. Weether Central banks acting as supervisors may h a v e played a role in this situation remains a question for further investigations.
In any case, we conclude that a clear motivation for the separation between monetary policy and bank supervisory agencies can not be found in data. Rather, the evolution of nancial intermediaries, moral hazard problem and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that a separation could be a better solution, also in order to clarify who is really paying for the costs of monetary policy and banking supervision.
We also criticize the current assignment of nancial regulatory and supervisory powers in the EU to domestic agencies. We are in favour of the establishment of two new European nancial regulation agencies, each formally separated by the ECB. These agencies should be responsible for the comprehensive coordination of both legislation and execution of regulation in nancial markets: the rst European agency should be responsible for the stability of all intermediaries, while the second for transparency and disclosure requirements. Our proposal is to to place these two agencies at the centre of two European Systems of Financial Supervisors, each structured similarly to the ESCB and thereby requiring active participation of national "Monopolist" countries "Not-Monopolist" countries Table 4 : Bank balance sheet comparisons between the "all banks" series and the "commercial banks" series in "monopolist" and "not-monopolist" countries (Average 1985 -94. Source: OECD, 1996 All banks in 
